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Abstract
In modern software development, the use of libraries is prevalent. Libraries
pose a big security challenge. How can we ensure that sensitive data is not
being leaked through libraries? This is the first question of the thesis. We
propose the use of information-flow control, by developing a principled
approach for allowing information-flow tracking in libraries, even if they
are written in a language not supporting information-flow control. With this
approach, we allow for library functions to have unlabel and relabel models,
explaining how values are unlabeled and relabeled when being marshaled
between the labeled program and the library. These models are used in
combination with lazy marshaling to handle structured data such as lists and
records, higher-order functions and references.
Modern browsers allow for browser modifications through browser ex-
tensions, which have special privileges and can, e.g., modify the DOM. As
extensions can be intrusive, it is in a webpage’s interest to know which
extensions are installed in a browser. The second question of the thesis is if
it is possible for a webpage to know which extensions are installed in the
browser? We conduct a large-scale study to determine how many extensions
that are detectable from a webpage based on the extension’s resources, show-
ing over 50% of the top 1000 Chrome extensions can be detected, as well as
how many of the Alexa top 100,000 webpages employ the technique of the
paper.
Keywords: information-flow control, language-based security, side-effectful
libraries, web security, browser extensions, large-scale study
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In society today, most business sectors are completely reliant on informa-
tion technology, and our day-to-day lives are moving online at an astonishing
pace. For example, we use computers to talk to friends, read newspapers,
watch movies, schedule events, make bank transfers, and buy merchandise.
With more and more of our private information going online, the need to
protect this information increases.
Unfortunately, it is hard to ensure that private information is not leaked
to unintended recipients – even for domain experts. Adding a simple fea-
ture, for example tracking how users use a web application, can lead to
private information being leaked [28]. In recent years, there have been
many reported breaches of security in big companies, where sensitive infor-
mation, such as credit card information, passwords and emails, has been
stolen [13, 3, 27, 22, 26, 21, 24, 8], leading to financial losses and even loss of
life [7].
A difficult problem to handle in modern applications is the use of libraries.
With growing code bases, and potentially different languages getting access
to sensitive information, securing the boundaries between a program and its
libraries is a big challenge. This challenge is the focus of the first two papers
of this thesis: tracking how information is flowing in a library used by a
trusted program.
With services coming in the shapes of web applications, we need web
browsers to access these services. But each individual has their own prefer-
ences on how the browsing should be. The users are therefore given the
opportunity to extend the browser with functionality via browser extensions.
There are cases where webpages try to determine what extensions are run-
ning, as the existence of an extension can lead to, for example, financial
losses due to ad blockers. Another reason can be because the webpage want
a clean environment due to handling of sensitive information, or because
the webpage is malicious and tries to fingerprint a user. The main goal of the
third paper of this thesis is to determine how many extensions for Chrome
and Firefox are susceptible to webpages trying to determine their existence.
The first two papers in this thesis are theoretical, whereas the third
paper is practical. The future goal is to enable end-to-end security for web
applications in the presence of libraries. Since e.g. extensions can manipulate
the DOM using JavaScript, “libraries” in this setting corresponds to the
DOM API in the browser.
The rest of this chapter is laid out as follows. Section 1 gives an introduc-
tion to information-flow control, which is the main security mechanism used
in this thesis. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the information security
challenges of libraries. Section 3 gives an introduction to browser extensions
before Section 4 lists the main contributions of the papers, along with the
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Program
instructions
Input
Input
Input
Output
Output
Output
Figure 0.1: An abstract program
contributions made by the author.
1 Information-Flow Control
In software development, the most common ways of checking if an appli-
cation is correct is through testing and code reviews. Although testing and
code reviews can find some security vulnerabilities, many are missed; see
for instance Heartbleed [33] and Shellshock [32].
Language-based security is a means to express security policies and
enforcement mechanisms using programming language techniques [30].
Frequently, the goal of language-based security is to be provably secure.
In this thesis, we will focus on the area of language-based security called
information-flow control (IFC). As is common, we work in a batch model of
programs, meaning that we see programs as black boxes, treating them
like functions from input to output (see Figure 0.1). We call the inputs to
the program sources, and the outputs of the program sinks. For all useful
programs, the outputs are dependent on the inputs. The dependencies from
sources to sinks are defined by the program source code, which is written in
some programming language.
In a multi-level system [9], information is classified into different levels,
based on a lattice. Typical example levels are unclassified Ď classified Ď
secret Ď top secret, where Ď is a relation defining how information is al-
lowed to flow. In the example above, unclassified data can flow anywhere,
and classified data can flow anywhere but to unclassified. IFC aims to enforce
that the information flow respects the Ď-relation. Without loss of generality,
we use a two-level lattice, L Ď H , where L is public (low) data and H is
secret (high) data. In this simplified setting, the security property we want to
enforce is that sources marked as H does not go to sinks marked as L, which
is known as noninterference [14].
1.1 Noninterference
Intuitively, noninterference is achieved if all runs of a program, where the
only difference is the high inputs, do not differ in the low output. This means
the crossed out dashed red line in Figure 0.2 is not allowed.
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Program
Private input
Public input
Private output
Public output
Figure 0.2: Noninterference
In this thesis, we will only consider termination-insensitive noninterference
(TINI) [31]. The implication of enforcement through TINI is that information
leakage through termination channels is not considered. Assuming hi is an
integer labeled H and print outputs on a public channel, the following
program is deemed secure by state-of-the-art IFC tools that do not take
termination into account.
1 f o r i in range ( 0 , Number .MAX_VALUE) {
2 p r i n t ( i ) ;
3 i f ( i == hi ) then loop_forever
4 }
As the for-loop is not dependent on the secret variable, the output on the
public channel is allowed. However, once i == hi, the program will be stuck
in an infinite loop, ensuring the final printed value on the public channel
to be the secret value, indicating there exists an implicit flow through a
termination channel [4]. TINI gives no guarantees about non-terminating
runs, since it is formulated in terms of terminating runs. Hence, TINI would
be unable to classify the program above as insecure.
1.2 Explicit and implicit flows
In order to achieve noninterference, we must track how information flows
within the program. There are two different kinds of flows: explicit and
implicit flows. An example of an explicit flow is when secret data is written
directly to a public sink or variable. Imagine two variables, lo, which is
labeled L, and hi, which is labeled H . An explicit flow would be lo := hi,
as the secret data in hi is written directly to the public variable lo. In contrast
to explicit flows, an implicit flow has no data being written directly from a
secret to a public sink or variable. Instead, the control flow of the application
is used to learn something about the secret data. As an example, consider
the following program that leaks if the variable hi is even or odd through
the control flow.
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6 I N T R O D U C T I O N
1 lo := f a l s e ;
2 i f ( hi ‘mod‘ 2 == 0) then lo := true ;
Note that although no information about the secret variable hi is explicitly
written to the public variable lo, we can still learn information about it.
1.3 Enforcing Information-Flow Control
Within IFC, there are two different main approaches of enforcement [29]. On
one hand, there is static enforcement, which is based on static analysis of
a program before it is executed. Volpano et al. [34] presented a type system
with the property that all well-typed programs in this system are sound with
respect to noninterference.
On the other hand, dynamic enforcement is executed at run-time, using a
modified semantics of the language to allow for security checking. Having
full access to the run-time environment and the run-time values, dynamic
enforcement often leads to a more permissive enforcement compared to the
static counterparts for dynamic languages such as JavaScript.
Additionally, there exists combinations of the static and dynamic enforce-
ments known as hybrid enforcement. With hybrid enforcement, a static en-
forcement mechanism can insert annotations during the compilation phase,
which can be checked at runtime [11, 12]. Similarly, a dynamic enforcement
mechanism can perform static analyses on parts of the program during
execution [19].
1.4 Dynamic Information-Flow Control
This thesis is based on purely dynamic IFC. The main reason we chose dy-
namic IFC is because dynamic languages, such as JavaScript, are widespread
and popular, especially on the web.
In dynamic IFC, all runtime values are augmented with a representation
of security labels. These labels are copied and joined to reflect the different
computations of the program. During execution, a program counter (pc) is
used to keep track of which level the current execution occurs in (known as
the security context). If secret data is used when computing the condition in an
if-statement, the pc is updated to reflect this, and the body of the if-statement
is executed under secret control. While under secret control, no public side-
effects should be allowed to take place. It is crucial that the handling of
side-effects under secret control is done in a safe manner. Otherwise there
is a risk of implicit flows into the labels. Consider the following example
from [6], where lo and tm are labeled L and hi is labeled H at the start of
the execution. What would be the implications of allowing labels to change
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2 L I B R A R I E S 7
freely, i.e. upgrading the security labels on the assigned variables on lines 3
and 4 if the assignment occurs?
1 lo := t rue ;
2 tm := true ;
3 i f ( hi == true ) then tm := f a l s e ;
4 i f ( tm == true ) then lo := f a l s e ;
If hi is true, then tm will be false based on the assignment on line 3, and its
security label upgraded to H , due to the pc being H . Since tm is false, the
condition in the if-statement on line 4 will be false, making no assignment
to lo, which means lo will continue to be true and labeled L. But if hi was
false, then no assignment would be made to tm on line 3, making tm remain
true and labeled L. This would make the assignment to lo on line 4 occur in
a low context due to the pc being L , making lo false and labeled L. The
end result in both situations is the value of hi being the same as lo, while lo
retains the label L. In other words, hi was leaked into lo!
The most direct way of preventing the problem in the previous example
and avoiding the implicit flows into the labels is to base the enforcement
on no sensitive-upgrades (NSU), which disallows upgrading low variables
when branching on secret data [5, 35]. With NSU, the assignment on line 3
would not be allowed, as there is a low upgrade under high control, causing
a termination of the program before the information leakage occurs.
A problem with NSU is that it can sometimes be too restrictive and mark
valid programs as invalid. One could argue the program
1 lo := true ;
2 i f ( hi == f a l s e ) then lo := f a l s e ;
is secure if the low variable lo is never written to a public sink, hence not
visible to an attacker. The program
1 lo := f a l s e ;
2 i f ( hi == f a l s e ) then lo := f a l s e ;
can also be deemed secure, since an attacker will not learn anything about hi
since the value of lo is never changed. This is known as value sensitivity [10]
and is not in scope of this thesis. The enforcement mechanisms of this thesis
would consider those programs insecure if hi is indeed false.
2 Libraries
One focus of this thesis is how to handle libraries with respect to information-
flow tracking. A major challenge is when the library is not written in the
same language as the labeled program. This usually happens in one of two
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8 I N T R O D U C T I O N
cases: 1) the library is part of the standard execution environment, and 2) the
library is brought into the language using a foreign function interface (FFI). An
FFI can therefore be used to extend a programming language with features,
such as network communication, not natively in the programming language.
When that happens, the values going between the labeled program and the
library must be translated, a process known as marshaling. This poses a big
challenge, since the security labels from the labeled program values must
be removed when values go into the library, and put back when values are
going from the library to the labeled program. Unlike standard marshaling,
which is lossless, this means that we lose data when marshaling between a
labeled program and an unlabeled library; we will not be able to compute
the labels of the return values without knowing the labels of the arguments.
To solve this, we need to keep a state in the marshaling process, where we
store the labels that are removed. The labels are stored with respect to a
function model for the library function, which defines how labels are removed
(through an unlabel model) and how they are re-attached (through a relabel
model). This interaction is what Papers I and II address.
2.1 Lazy marshaling
When marshaling structured values, such as lists, the question of how to do
it effectively arises. It can be done strictly, where the full value is marshaled
directly. This is expensive for large structured data, as we might marshal
more than is needed for the computation. Another way is to do it lazily,
which allows for marshaling on a need basis. With lazy marshaling, only
the traversed elements of the structured data affect the computed return
label. Imagine having a list of ten elements, but only the first two are needed
for the computation. Strict marshaling would marshal the full list, but lazy
marshaling would marshal exactly the two needed elements.
This notion of lazy marshaling extends naturally to all types of structured
data, including records and objects as well.
3 Browser extensions
In order to increase web browser functionality, users install browser exten-
sions. Examples of browser extensions are ad blockers to block advertisement
on webpages, anti-tracking extensions to avoid tracking from tracking soft-
ware, and password managers to make it easier to have unique passwords
for all services. But it comes at a cost, as extensions are given permissions
greater than those of a webpage. For instance, an extension can inject arbi-
trary code [16], with some malicious extensions actually injecting tracking
software to track their users on every webpage they visit [18]. Even worse, if
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4 C O N T R I B U T I O N S 9
an extension has a vulnerability, it might allow webpages to execute arbitrary
code with elevated privileges [2, 1]. It is in a webpage’s interest to know
which extensions a user has installed, as it can lead to, for instance, financial
losses due to less advertisements being showed, or to prevent arbitrary code
being injected when paying bills over an internet bank.
Webpages can detect extensions using behavioral analysis, where one tries
to detect extensions by looking for the effects of the extension. An example
of this would be to check for the presence or absence of elements on the
webpage. It is, however, difficult to use behavioral analysis to identify a
specific extension – there are, for instance, several different ad blockers that
have the same behavior. Behavioral analysis is also costly, as it requires time
and effort to analyse and keep up-to-date with extension updates. Is there
an easier way to determine which extensions a user has installed? This is the
question tackled in Paper III.
4 Contributions
This thesis presents three papers, where Paper I and Paper III are published
in peer-reviewed conferences. Paper II is currently under submission. All
three papers presented are extended versions.
4.1 A Principled Approach to Tracking Information Flow in the
Presence of Libraries
In this paper, we explore and develop an approach for tracking the infor-
mation flow in a program that uses libraries. The program is assumed to be
written in an information-flow aware language, whereas the library is not.
The development is made gradually, starting with a small core language
which is then extended with lists and higher-order functions. The general
idea is based on unlabel and relabel models, which defines how labels are
removed when marshaling to the library, and how labels are re-attached
when marshaling back to the labeled world. An important part in the paper
is the lazy marshaling, which increases the precision in the tracking as only
the used parts of for example a list will affect the resulting label when mar-
shaling back to the labeled world. The system is proven sound with respect
to noninterference.
Statement of contribution This paper was co-authored with Daniel Hedin,
Frank Piessens and Andrei Sabelfeld. Alexander’s contributions was to
define the syntax and semantics together with Daniel, implement prototypes
thesis March 22, 2018 0:17 Page 10 
	

	 
	

	
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for testing the ideas, and prove soundness of the different systems. All
authors contributed to the writing of the paper equally.
Appeared in Principles of Security and Trust (POST), Uppsala, Sweden, April
2017
4.2 Information Flow Tracking for Side-effectful Libraries
The second paper of the thesis is a continuation of the first paper, where the
major contribution is the addition of references and with that, side-effects.
The core system was overhauled, introducing a model heap instead of passing
the model state as an (implicit) parameter. With the use of a persistent
heap structure, the list and higher-order functions from Paper I had to be
modified, along with an extension of records, references and side-effects. The
lazy marshaling remained for lists, as well as for the newly implemented
records, but the model language was extended to also contain side-effect
constraints, where the side-effect constraints are models for how the side-
effects can manipulate data. The theoretical work is formalised in Coq [20],
showing the system is sound with respect to noninterference.
This work, along with Paper I provides a core for how to track informa-
tion flow in stateful libraries with structured data and higher-order func-
tions.
Statement of contribution This paper was co-authored with Daniel Hedin
and Andrei Sabelfeld. Alexander’s contributions was to define the syntax
and semantics, conduct the case study on a file system library, creating the
examples and implementing the prototype. He also wrote an initial version
of the paper, which served as the base when turning it to a coherent paper.
All authors contributed equally in the latter process.
4.3 Discovering Browser Extensions via Web Accessible
Resources
Webpages can perform browser fingerprinting, by detecting specific configu-
rations of the hardware, see for instance Panopticlick [25]. But can extensions
be detected by webpages, without the need of analysing their behavior? The
third paper explores what knowledge can be gained from a webpage about
a user’s installed browser extensions. It takes advantage of web accessible
resources (WARs), which are public resources for an extension [17]. These
WARs can be fetched from any webpage, indicating that all extensions that
have at least one listed WAR can easily be detected.
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This work includes downloading all free extensions for Chrome [15] and
Mozilla [23], as well as crawling the Alexa top 100,000 pages and analyse
the requests made, to determine if this technique is widely used. It also
includes potential measures one can implement in order to avoid this kind
of detection.
Statement of contribution This paper was co-authored with Steven Van
Acker and Andrei Sabelfeld. Alexander’s contributions was the extensions
experiment (all but the Alexa part), as well as defining the measures and
develop the prototype for detecting extensions. All authors contributed
equally to writing the paper.
Appeared in Proceedings of the Seventh ACM on Conference on Data and
Application Security and Privacy (CODASPY), Scottsdale, AZ, USA, March 2017
5 Differences between Paper I and Paper II
Although the first two papers of this thesis handle the same topic, there are
differences between them. At a high level, Paper II is a superset of Paper I,
where the main difference is the addition of more language features, such as
records and references. However, when looking at the semantic modelling,
there are several key differences that enable the combination of first class
mutable state and higher-order functions.
In Paper I, models are defined for library functions, explaining how to
unlabel the parameters and relabel the result, where the removed labels are
stored in a model state, which is a map from identifiers to labels. Updates to
the models occur when data is being marshaled from the program to the
library. With the addition of structured data and higher-order functions, the
model state is tied to the wrapper functions via copying when the relabeling
operation occurs. Unfortunately, this is not extendable to references, as they
require a shared mutable state. Consider the following code snippet, where the
code above %% is the program code and the code below is the library code.
1 l e t ( g , r ) = l i b f 10
2 in r := upg 15 H;
3 g 10
4 %%
5 f x =
6 l e t r = r e f x
7 in (\y . ! r , r )
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The library function creates a reference to x on line 6, and uses this for
a returned tuple with the first element being a callback function which
dereferences the reference, and the second element is the actual reference on
line 7. What would be the effect in Paper I when the program code is being
executed? On line 1, the program binds the returned tuple from calling f
to (g, r). It then writes the high value 15 to r (line 2), before calling the
returned function g (line 3). Both values in the tuple should work on the same
reference. However, Paper I would fail to model this due to the state not being
shared. When relabeling, the wrappers for g and r would be given a copy of
the model, making the model update from writing to r happen locally in the
wrapper for r. The end result would be r being the secret value 15, and the
result of calling g 10 would be the public value 15, as the value is written to
the reference, but the model of g is not updated.
The conclusion is that reference models must be shared between all
values that have access to the reference. To do this, Paper II moves to a
stack/heap based structure. The stack contains pointers to model frames,
which reside on the heap. The frames on the heap represent scopes, and
form scope chains in combination with the stack. In Paper II, the wrapper
functions receives pointers to model frames, which allows for a shared view
of the model frames residing on the heap. References and callbacks returned
from the library are now tied to the local scope of the function. The example
above would now work differently. As the wrappers for g and r are defined
in the same function, the system in Paper II would copy the same frame
pointer stack to both wrappers. When the writing to the returned reference
occurs on line 2, the written labeled value would be unlabeled, updating the
model frame pointed to by the frame pointer with the secret label. As g and
r have copies of the same pointers, the updated model of the reference in
the library is seen when g 10 is called, returning a secret value.
In Paper II, the model state is divided into two parts: the library model
state and the call model state. The library model state contains the information
needed to lift a library function to the labeled world, i.e. the library model
state is used to lift the library function f on line 1. As the lifted library
function expects unlabeled parameters when it is invoked, the call model
state will hold the labels of the parameters, i.e. the call model state will hold
the labels from lines 2 and 3. Everything defined in the library will share the
same library model state and the call model states are linked via the stack of
pointers. Since the created wrappers can have copies of the same stack of
model frame pointers, modifications to the model frames pointed to in the
shared library model state residing on the heap is seen by everyone who has
a model frame pointer to that model frame. This ensures the same view of
the library state, even in the presence of mutability.
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